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Introduction 
 
The last fifty years of unprecedented development in the world have improved human 
condition enormously but at the same time have resulted in increasing gaps between the poor 
and the rich and in adverse environmental impacts on all scales, from indoor air pollution to 
climate change and biodiversity loss. The current development patterns are thus clearly 
unsustainable. A fundamental paradigm change is needed for a shift toward more sustainable 
development paths.  
 
The recent financial crisis and the ensuing ever deeper economic depression are no doubt 
going to bring additional hardship especially to those without access to basic human needs. A 
predominant social issue that is increasingly becoming a major preoccupation for world 
leaders is addressing social inequality and poverty, especially in the developing world 
(Karekezi and Sihag, 2004). The longer the economic crisis deepens, the more threatened will 
be those living in poverty.  
 
In response to the call to fight social inequality and poverty, the world leaders endorsed the 
United Nations Millennium Goals (MDGs) as agreed upon by the Millennium General 
Assembly of the UN in 2000 and as further advanced in 2002 at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development. The MDGs include eight specific goals but the primary objective is 
to half extreme poverty by 2015 (Elliot, 2005). It is becoming increasingly evident that at 
current trends this goal will not be achieved even decades later in the poorest countries and 
regions of the world. Thus, it is urgent to devote significant effort toward the achievement of 
the MDGs and a more sustainable development paths thereafter.  
 
Currently, it is estimated that about 2.6 billion people live on less than two and a half dollars a 
day (Chen and Ravallion, 2008; World Bank, 2008) — 75 percent of whom reside in rural 
areas (IADB, undated). Furthermore, it is estimated that 1.4 billion people live in extreme 
poverty (World Bank, 2008). This estimate is an upward revision from the previous one of 
one billion people in extreme poverty. This trend underscores the importance for increasing 
efforts to meet MDGs. 
 
Affordable access to modern energy services has a significant role to play in meeting 
development goals as it is a fundamental prerequisite for reaching virtually all MDGs. 
However, modern energy services in the majority of developing countries are characterized by 
inequitable access, notably between the poor and affluent; as well as, between rural and urban 
areas. At the national level, this is demonstrated by the low levels of modern energy in the 
primary energy supply mix; low electrification levels; and, low electricity consumption levels.  
About two billion people in the world, a third of the world population, are without access to 
modern energy and about 1.6 billion are without access to electricity – the very symbol of 
affluence and modernity – while still about 2.4 billion cook with traditional forms of biomass. 
Limited access to cleaner energy services supplied by modern energy carriers is an important 
contributor to rising levels of poverty in some sub-Saharan African countries (UNDP, 2007a 
and b).  
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It is estimated that connection of a household without access to electricity costs on the order 
of thousand dollars (Goldemberg, 2009) resulting in total capital needs of about $400 billion, 
assuming on average about five persons per household and two billion without access. 
Distributed over say twenty years, this translates into annual investment requirements of some 
$20 billion. This represents a huge investment that is lacking but that does not appear 
excessive in comparison to gigantic scale of the government guarantees and dept cancellation 
in the financial sector since the crisis has emerged. To be effective, this kind of investment 
would have to be enhanced with a certain level of free energy for the poorest, say 200 kWh 
per year or about half a kWh per day. 
 
Thus, there is a clear need to embark on a new development path toward sustainable and 
affordable access to adequate energy services. Fortunately, many policies and measures 
directed toward increasing access to modern energy services have multiple benefits for other 
development goals, from the reduction of in-door air pollution and its assaults on human 
health to reductions of GHG emissions. 
  
Some may argue that this transformation toward more sustainable development paths and 
energy patterns in the world will be difficult to achieve because falling consumer demand 
leads to a vicious circle that results in ever less employment decreasing further the demand for 
traditional goods and services. 
 
At the same time, this crisis of the “old” is an opportunity for the “new” to emerge. This is an 
opportunity that needs to be sized and should not go to waste. Joseph Schumpeter has referred 
to this kind of paradigm-changing transformations as “gales of creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter, 1942). As old techno-economic and institutional development paths saturates, 
the chances for fundamentally new development paths to emerge and eventually diffuse are 
more likely.  
 
Decarbonization of the global economy toward a carbon-free future is such a paradigm-
changing transformation. It appears to be a must, given the ever more threatening 
manifestations of the global climate change. The unequivocal message of the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report is that climate change is accelerating and that it is almost certainly largely 
man-made. Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) over the last two centuries, 
since the beginning of the industrial revolution, have increased atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide from some 280ppm to over 380ppm today. The IPCC estimates that the global 
average surface temperature has increased by some 0.8oC during the last century. The 
negative effects of the climate change can already be felt and determined action from the 
international community is required to promote innovation and technological developments 
for climate protection. This is particularly critical for the developing parts of the world as they 
are much more vulnerable to adverse consequences of climate change due to lower adaptive 
capacity associated with poverty and insufficient investment.  
 
Historical Development and the Evolution of Energy Systems 
 
In 1750, the world’s population was approximately 750 million people after some ten 
thousand years of slow but steady increase that resulted from the spread of ever better 
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agricultural practices throughout the world as the aftermath of the Neolithic revolution. It is 
estimated that during the last thousand years the population has been growing at some 0.1 
percent per year, or doubling on the order of every 500 years. The characteristic size of the 
global population was less than 50 million throughout the age of agriculture since the 
beginning of the Neolithic revolution (Graham Zabel, Population and Energy, August 2000, 
http://dieoff.org/). 
 
With the emergence of the industrial revolution things changed radically. Table 1 shows that 
in 1800 global population was about one billion compared to over 6.5 billion today. This 
represents more than a six fold increase and corresponds to an annual growth rate of close to 
one percent per year. At this rate, the global population would continue to double every 80 
years. Clearly, this historical rate of population growth is not sustainable. The explosive 
population growth was a result of drastic mortality decrease. Improved water quality, diet, 
sanitary conditions and medicine have all contributed. Today, the life expectancy is twice as 
high in the industrialized regions compared to that still prevailing in some regions of the 
world (75 years compared to about 35 in pre-industrial agricultural societies).  
 
  1800 2000 Factor 
Population (billion) 1 6 x6 
GDP PPP 
(trillion 1990 $) 
0.5 36 x72 
Primary Energy (EJ) 13 440 x34 
CO2 Emissions (GtC) 0.3 6.4 x21 
Mobility (km/person/day) 0.04 40 x1000 
Table 1. Absolute growth and corresponding factors from 1800 to 2000.  Global 
population has increased to 6.5 billion in the meantime along with other factors. The 
growth of GDP (measured at purchasing power parietals, PPP) has outpaced the 
population growth by more than an order of magnitude meaning that an average person 
today is more than ten times more affluent compared to an average one in 1800. Primary 
energy increased at half the rate compared to GDP meaning that energy intensity of the 
global economy has declined at about one percent per year. The carbon dioxide 
emissions increased even less indicating a pervasive historical trend toward 
decarbonisation of the global economy at about 1.3 percent per year. Some of human 
activities like mobility and information increased orders of magnitude faster compared 
to GDP and energy. 
 
Human productivity has increased enormously in terms of physical and monetary output per 
hour of work. To a large extent this was possible because of the replacement of human and 
animal work by machines fuelled by fossil energy releasing most of the agricultural land for 
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food production. This historical transition is reflected in the enormous increase in global 
energy needs by a factor of 34 during the last two centuries. 
 
As a result of this impressive increase in affluence, those who are fortunate to benefit from 
formal employment work roughly half the time compared to workers and farmers at the 
beginning of the industrial revolution. The annual work effort is somewhere between one and 
a half and to two thousand hours per annum in most of the developed countries. The reduction 
in working time in conjunction with long life expectancy means that today those engaged in 
formal work have about four times as much “free-time” over their lifetime, compared to two 
hundred years ago. Free or leisure time is often expended in consumptive mode such as 
increased mobility. Table 1 illustrates that the mobility has increased by three orders of 
magnitude during the last tree centuries. For example, in 1800 an average person in France 
travelled some twenty meters per day mostly on horseback and to a much lesser extent by boat, 
whereas today the average mobility is some fifty kilometres per person per day, mostly by car 
and by bus and about one kilometres per person per day by rail and air (Gruebler, 1998a).  
 
Industrialization has changed the very fabric of human society and existence. An aggregate 
characterization of the multitude of changes is the Gross World (Economic) Product (GDP, 
which is an acronym for Gross Domestic Product) that measures the value of all goods and 
services associated with the formal economies. Table 1 shows the global GDP increasing 
more than seventy fold during the last two centuries, corresponding to an annual increase of 
two percent per year and a doubling in thirty five years. 
 
However, two-thirds of the global population is excluded from the benefits of this 
development. Bringing them to the same levels of affluence and consumption would mean 
that the planetary process would be starched beyond the limits of the carrying capacities. In 
other words, further development in the world must take an alternative path and not follow the 
unsustainable one of the now industrialized and wealthy parts of the world. 
 
An essential prerequisite of this continuous development process has been the ever-increasing 
quantity and quality of energy services with steadily improving efficiency of the energy 
systems. Figure 1 shows that in 1800 the world depended on traditional biomass (mostly 
fuelwood and agricultural waste) as the main energy source for cooking, heating and 
manufacturing. Human physical labour and work of animals were the main sources of 
mechanical energy, with some much more humble contributions of wind and hydraulic power. 
Figure 1 shows how drastically the nature of energy services has been transformed through 
replacement of traditional (non-commercial) energy sources by coal. In 1850 coal provided 
some twenty percent of global primary energy needs and peaked in the 1920s at almost 
seventy percent. This can be characterized as the first energy transition. The coal age brought 
railways, steam power, steel, manufacturing and telegraph to mention some of the 
technologies that constituted the “coal cluster.”  
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Figure 1: Global primary energy requirements since 1850, shown the six most important 
energy sources. Biomass is mostly traditional use of fuelwood. Hydropower includes all 
other modern renewable energy sources except biomass. Two development phases are 
clear visible, the replacement of traditional biomass by coal from 1850 to about 1920 and 
replacement of coal and traditional biomass by crude oil and later natural gas. Fossil 
energy sources provide about 80 percent of global energy needs. The fasted growth is for 
the modern renewables such as wind power and solar energy. Also shown are some of 
the more important technological changes that accompanied vigorous growth of global 
energy requirements. 
 
Around 1900 motor vehicles were introduced along with petrochemicals, electricity and many 
other technologies that constitute the “oil cluster.” It took another seventy years for oil to 
replace coal as the dominant source of energy in the world. Today, the global energy system is 
much more complex with many competing sources of energy and many high-quality and 
convenient energy carriers ranging form grid-oriented forms such as natural gas and 
electricity, to liquids that are mostly used in transportation to solids (coal and biomass) still 
used in the developing parts of the world (where a third of global population lives that still 
does not have access to modern energy services). Taken together, fossil energy sources 
provide some eighty percent of global energy needs, while fuelwood, hydropower and nuclear 
energy provide the rest. 
 
Affordable and convenient energy services were one of the primary drivers for the emergence 
of the Anthopocene (Crutzen, xxx). They helped increase human productivity in all sectors 
from agriculture to industrial production and provision of services, and replaced human and 
animal work by abundant sources of power. Table 1 shows that the energy intensity of 
economic activities has in fact declined two fold but the 72 fold increase in economic 
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activities required ever more energy. As the share of fossil energy sources, taken together, 
increased from 20 to 80% between 1850 and now, so did the emissions of carbon dioxide (as 
an unavoidable by-product of combustion). Consequently, energy-related emissions of CO2 
increased 22 fold to about 6 billion tons of carbon (6 GtC) today. Nevertheless, they have 
increased at a substantially lower level than energy requirements indicating substantive 
historical trend toward decarbonisation of our societies. 
 
Human Development and Climate Change 
 
The more than twenty-fold increase in global carbon dioxide emissions resulted in a dramatic 
increase of its atmospheric concentrations from about 280 parts per million (ppm) volume in 
1750 to over 380 ppm today. (The difference of 100 ppm is equivalent to atmospheric 
concentrations changes between glacial and inter-glacial periods during the past million years 
that were associated of with global mean temperature changes of about 6 degrees Celsius.) 
Emissions of other radiatively active gases in the atmosphere have accompanied the increase 
in carbon dioxide. Methane concentrations have doubled over the same period. CFCs are a 
fundamentally new, anthropogenic constituent of the atmosphere that did not exist in nature. 
Another indication of the involved complexities is that emissions of sulphur aerosols and 
particulate matter increase along with the energy consumption and emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs). Aerosol emissions are now regulated in most of industrialized countries and 
are in decline, but they have resulted in regional cooling that has offset some of the climate 
warming caused by increasing concentrations of GHGs. 
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Figure 2. Increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations during the last ten 
thousand years and the resulting increase in radiative forcing (that measures the 
warming effect) compared to the radiative forcing of the solar radiation at the top of the 
atmosphere of 343 W/m2. The insert shows the concentrations increase since 1750 from 
about 2800 ppm to over 380 ppm today. Source: IPCC, 2007. 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that the climate change is 
unequivocal and that global mean temperature has increased by some 0.8 degrees Celsius 
since the beginning of the industrialization (IPCC, 2007). This is likely to double even if 
anthropogenic emissions were to cease immediately due to the huge inertia of the climate 
system. Eleven of the last dozen years have been warmest on the record. This is just one 
telltale sign of the unsustainability of current trends and consumptions patters; another of 
many reasons why the development path of now industrialized countries should not be 
replicated by the developing world with the vast majority of global population. The question 
we pose in this paper is whether there are alternative development paths that can lead to 
alleviation of poverty, increase of human living standards and protect climate and 
environment at the same time.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Increase of the mean temperature increase since 1850 of about 0.8 degrees 
Celsius. Most of the increase is attributed to human activities and the warming is 
“unequivocal”. Source: IPCC, 2007. 
 
Essentially, any specific concentration or radiative forcing target, from the lowest to the 
highest, requires emissions to eventually fall to very low levels as the removal processes of 
the ocean and terrestrial systems saturate. For low to medium stabilisation targets, this would 
need to occur during this century. However, to reach a given stabilization target, emissions 
must ultimately be reduced well below current levels. For achievement of the very low 
stabilization targets from many high baseline emissions scenarios, negative net emissions are 
required toward the end of the century. One of the few technologies that results in negative 
emissions in carbon capture and storage (CCS) in conjunction with sustainable biomass. 
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Mitigation efforts over the next two or three decades will have a large impact on opportunities 
to achieve lower stabilization levels (Fisher et al., 2007).  
 
Figure 4. Global CO2 emissions for 1940 to 2000 and emissions ranges for categories of 
stabilisation scenarios from 2000 to 2100 (left-hand panel); and the corresponding 
relationship between the stabilisation target and the likely equilibrium global average 
temperature increase above pre-industrial (right-hand panel). Approaching equilibrium 
can take several centuries, especially for scenarios with higher levels of stabilisation. 
Coloured shadings show stabilisation scenarios grouped according to different targets 
(stabilisation category I to VI). Right-hand panel shows ranges of global average 
temperature change above pre-industrial, using (i) “best estimate” climate sensitivity of 
3°C (black line in middle of shaded area), (ii) upper bound of likely range of climate 
sensitivity of 4.5°C (red line at top of shaded area) (iii) lower bound of likely range of 
climate sensitivity of 2°C (blue line at bottom of shaded area). Black dashed lines in the 
left panel give the emissions range of recent baseline scenarios published since the SRES 
(2000). Emissions ranges of the stabilisation scenarios comprise CO2-only and multi-gas 
(all GHGs and other radiatively active substances) scenarios and correspond to the 10th-
90th percentile of the full scenario distribution. Note: CO2 emissions in most models do 
not include emissions from decay of above ground biomass that remains after logging 
and deforestation, and from peat fires and drained peat soils. 
 
The timing of emission reductions depends on the stringency of the stabilization target. 
Lowest stabilization targets require an earlier peak of CO2 and CO2-equivalent emissions. In 
the majority of the scenarios in the most stringent stabilization category (a stabilization level 
below 490 ppm CO2-equivalent, see Figure 4 above), emissions are required to decline before 
2015 and are further reduced to less than 50 percent of today’s emissions by 2050. For 
somewhat higher stabilization levels (e.g. below 590 ppm CO2-equivalent) global emissions 
in the scenarios generally peak around 2010–2030, followed by a return to 2000 levels, on 
average around 2040. For high stabilization levels (e.g. below 710 ppm CO2-equivalent) the 
median emissions peak around 2040 (Fisher et al., 2007). These kind of radical emissions 
reductions depart fundamentally from the current trends and will thus require paradigm 
changing transition of the global energy system toward full decarbonisation.  
 
Thus, the need for fundamental changes of the global energy system, land-use patterns and 
also human behaviour is evident. Of outmost importance are technology improvements, 
diffusion of advanced technologies, learning-by-doing, and induced technological change, 
both for achieving the stabilization targets and cost reductions. While the technology 
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improvement and use of advanced technologies have been employed in scenarios largely 
exogenously in most of the literature, new literature covers learning-by-doing and endogenous 
technological change. The latter scenarios show different technology dynamics and ways in 
which technologies are deployed, while maintaining the key role of technology in achieving 
stabilization and cost reduction (Fisher et al., 2007). This literature outlines the fundamental 
paradigm change and the transition from current to future decarbonised global economy. In 
this scenario literature, the “new” replaces the “old”, emissions intensive, human activities 
and consumption patterns.  
 
Decarbonization of energy trends are persistent in the majority of reference and mitigation 
policy scenarios. The medians of scenario sets indicate decarbonisation rates of around 0.9 
and 0.6 percent per year compared to historical rates of about 0.3 percent per year. 
Improvements of carbon intensity of energy supply and the whole economic need to be much 
faster than in the past for the low stabilization levels. On the upper end of the range, 
decarbonisation rates of up to 2.5 percent per year are observed in more stringent stabilization 
scenarios, where complete transition away from carbon-intensive fuels is considered (Fisher et 
al., 2007). 
 
The scenarios that report quantitative results with drastic CO2 reduction targets of 60 to 80 
percent in 2050 (compared to today’s emission levels) require increased rates of energy 
intensity and carbon intensity improvement by two to three times their historical levels. This 
is found to require different sets of mitigation options across regions, with varying shares of 
nuclear energy, carbon capture and storage (CCS), biomass and hydrogen and other advanced 
energy carriers. 
 
The costs of stabilization crucially depend on the choice of the baseline, related technological 
change and resulting baseline emissions; stabilization target and level; and the portfolio of 
technologies considered. Additional factors include assumptions with regard to the use of 
flexible instruments and with respect to revenue recycling. Some literature identifies low-cost 
technology clusters that allow for endogenous technological learning with uncertainty. This 
suggests that a decarbonised economy may not cost any more than a carbon-intensive one, if 
technological learning is taken into account (Nakicenovic and Gritsevsky, 2000 and Fisher et 
al., 2007). 
There are different metrics for reporting costs of emission reductions, although most models 
report them in terms of macro-economic indicators, particularly GDP losses (GDP decline in 
stabilisation scenario in comparison with the baseline). For stabilization at about 590 to 710 
ppm CO2-equivalent, macro-economic costs range from -1 to 2 percent of GDP below 
baseline in 2050 (negative number means above the baseline, or GDP gains due to mitigation 
efforts). For a more stringent target of about 535 to 590 ppm CO2-equivalent, the costs range 
from slightly negative to 4 percent GDP loss. GDP losses in the lowest stabilization scenarios 
in the literature in the range of 445 to 535 ppm CO2-equivalent are generally below 5.5 
percent by 2050, however the number of studies is relatively limited and is developed from 
predominantly low baselines (Fisher et al., 2007).  
Multi-gas emission-reduction scenarios are able to meet climate targets at substantially lower 
costs compared to CO2-only strategies (for the same targets, Fisher et al., 2007). Inclusion of 
other nonGnonnon-CO2 (GHG) gases provides a more diversified approach that offers greater 
flexibility in the timing of the reduction programme. 
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Including land-use mitigation options as abatement strategies provides greater flexibility and 
cost-effectiveness for achieving stabilization. Even if land activities are not considered as 
mitigation alternatives by policy, consideration of land (land-use and land cover) is crucial in 
climate stabilization for its significant atmospheric inputs and withdrawals (emissions, 
sequestration, and albedo). Recent stabilization studies indicate that land-use mitigation 
options could provide 15 to 40 percent of total cumulative abatement over the century. 
Agriculture and forestry mitigation options are projected to be cost-effective abatement 
strategies across the entire century. In some scenarios, increased commercial biomass energy 
(solid and liquid fuel) is a significant abatement strategy, providing 5 to 30 percent of 
cumulative abatement and potentially 1 to 15 percent of total primary energy over the century 
(Fisher et al., 2007).  
 
IPCC concluded that the decision-making concerning the appropriate level of mitigation in a 
cost-benefit context is an iterative risk-management process that considers investment in 
mitigation and adaptation, co-benefits of undertaking climate change decisions and the 
damages due to climate change. It is intertwined with development decisions and pathways. 
Cost-benefit analysis tries to quantify climate change damages in monetary terms as the social 
cost of carbon (SCC) or time-discounted damages. Due to considerable uncertainties and 
difficulties in quantifying non-market damages, it is difficult to estimate SCC with confidence. 
Results depend on a large number of normative and empirical assumptions that are not known 
with any certainty. SCC estimates in the literature vary by three orders of magnitude. Often 
they are likely to be understated and will increase a few percent per year (i.e. 2.4 percent for 
carbon-only and 2 to 4 percent for the social costs of other greenhouse gases (IPCC, WGIII, 
Chapter 3 and Working Group II, Chapter 20). SCC estimates for 2030, range between 8 and 
$189/tCO2-equivalent (WGII, Chapter 20), which compares to carbon prices between $1 to 24  
per tonne of CO2-equivalent for mitigations scenarios stabilizing between 485-570 ppm CO2-
equivalent) and $31 to 121  per tonne of CO2-equivalent for scenarios stabilizing between 
440-485 ppm CO2-equivalent, respectively. 
 
Figure 5 shows vividly the connection between stabilisation levels and adverse impacts on ten 
important sectors. All of the stabilisation levels above two degrees Celsius corresponding to 
concentrations of about 445 to 490 ppm CO2-equivalent lead to “dangerous interference” with 
the climate system and vulnerabilities in all ten sectors associated with human well being. In 
contrast, lower stabilisation levels allow for adaptation in most of the ten sectors and for the 
very low levels (comparable to today’s climate) fall into the coping range. 
 
All stabilisation scenarios indicate that a huge share of emissions reductions would come from 
the energy systems, in the range of 60 to 80 percent. In all of them, energy efficiency plays a 
key role in achieving radical emissions reductions. In a way, it is a prerequisite for increasing 
shares of zero-carbon energy systems. Including non-CO2 and CO2 land-use and forestry 
mitigation options provides greater flexibility and cost-effectiveness. Low stabilisation 
levels require early investments and substantially more rapid diffusion and commercialisation 
of advanced low-emissions technologies. Without substantial investment flows and effective 
technology transfer across the world, it would be difficult to achieve emission reduction at a 
significant scale. Mobilizing financing of incremental costs of low-carbon technologies is 
essential component of any long-term climate stabilization strategy (Fisher et al., 2007). 
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Figure 5. The vulnerabilities of ten key sectors to climate change, from water security 
and coastal communities to natural ecosystems and sustainable development. The 
colours of range from coping to adapting and vulnerability that leads to adverse impacts 
of climate change.  The current global temperature increase of 0.8 degrees Celsius is 
shown to lead to the need to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change in four of the 
ten sectors. Stabilisation at two degrees is still in the coping range for eight of the ten 
sectors. Higher levels of stabilization clearly lead to the possibility of dangerous climate 
change that is beyond the estimated adaptive capacity. See Figure 4 for stabilisation of 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases that correspond to the average global 
temperature change. Source: IPCC, 2007. 
 
Technological Change as a Learning Process 
 
It is becoming widely accepted among historians of technology and economists that 
technological change is a fundamental determinant of social progress and economic 
development.  This is well illustrated by the above example (see Figure 1) of technological 
change in energy systems that expanded through more than an order of magnitude in two 
centuries, typical long-term growth rates being in the order of three to four percent per year.  
Yet the dynamics of technological change is external to most models of economic 
development and the resulting emissions scenarios be they for a whole country, or energy, 
transport or agriculture sectors alone. Technological change is as of now an exogenous 
determinant of growth in practically all models of economic and environmental interactions.  
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Drawing on the historical examples of technological change and development, we will outline 
a possible way of endogenising technological learning as driving force of social and economic 
change. 
 
Every new technology has its roots in an invention, but it is through an innovation process, 
diffusion and pervasive adoption that technological change is perceived and impacts all of us 
in daily lives.  In a highly stylized manner each technology undergoes a number of 
development phases starting with an basic invention and early development, followed by 
diffusion, if the technology turns our to be successful at the market place, and ending with a 
period of maturity and possibly also senescence.  This is the simplified life-cycle model of 
technological development borrowed from analogies with biological growth and development. 
The actual process of technological change as illustrated for energy systems in Figure 1 is 
more complex. In detail, it encompasses patterns and drivers of technological change across 
sectors, over time, and across space. In terms of systems hierarchy, technological change 
arises from the spatial and temporal diffusion of individual innovations all the way up to the 
emergence of new technological combinations that could fundamentally redefine products, 
services, even entire markets. The complexities are intricate and include phenomena of deep 
technological uncertainty, spatial heterogeneity, as well as the potential economic, societal 
and environmental impacts that could result from pervasive diffusion and adoption of new 
technologies (Gruebler et al., 1999). 
 
Each technology starts with some kind of invention, and its economic significance starts with 
innovation. According to Freeman (1986) the extremely important distinction between 
invention and innovation goes back to Schumpeter and has since been generally incorporated 
into economic theory.  An invention is an idea, a sketch or model for a new or improved 
device, product, process or system.  Inventions may often (not always) be patented but they do 
not necessarily lead to technological innovations.  In fact the majority do not.  An innovation 
is accomplished only with the first practical application of an invention, sometimes meaning 
the first commercial transaction involving the new product, process, system or device, 
although the word is more often used to describe the whole process of going from invention to 
the market.  
 
Today, invention usually refers to basic research and development, but it can also be an 
unexpected breakthrough, a completely new idea.  In fact, efforts to generate discoveries and 
inventions have been increasingly promoted by specialized public and private programs 
generally referred to as R&D efforts. This reflects the increasing recognition by public and 
private institutions that R&D efforts are an intrinsic prerequisites for economic development.  
Today, innovation process is as an important element of public and private technology polices. 
Usually it is based on applied research often with an explicit objective to achieve practical 
demonstration or a pilot project with a promise of commercialization (Gruebler et al., xxx and 
xxx). 
 
Both of these two phases, invention and innovation, are usually resource intensive, they take a 
lot of time and have relatively low success rate.  Like in biology, the selection mechanisms 
are stringent and only a few are chosen.  Most importantly, neither invention nor innovation 
have any direct economic importance (except in terms of expectations), rather they are a 
precondition for early deployment of the technology in a market place and its 
commercialization.  Economic significance of a technology really starts with its introduction 
 14
in a market place and onset of competition with its alternatives.  This usually occurs in niche 
markets.  The distinction between the initial innovation and technology transfer disappears 
from this point on the development of technology. New technologies are generally more 
expensive and in many ways inferior compared to their more mature alternatives. But often 
they provide a new service of function not possible with the old technologies; e.g. precision of 
a digital clock compared to the best analog counterpart or speed of a jet airplane compared to 
the best piston engine powered model, zero-emissions compared to uncontrolled pollution. 
 
The main attractiveness of new technologies, however, is that they hold the promise of 
improving market competitiveness in time.  This applies equally to transfer of new 
technologies. The expectation is of declining costs and improving performance with 
accumulated knowledge.  Figure 6 shows declining price of new technology starting with the 
introduction phase and accelerating during the growth phase, ending with only incremental 
improvements with onset of maturity.  Thus, the improvement rates of new technologies can 
be more rapid compared to their more mature counterparts provided that niche markets exist 
or are created and provided that this is a continuous process. Innovation continues throughout 
the life cycle of a technology.  Basic innovation that creates a new technology is followed by 
incremental innovations for improving performance and reducing costs. This requires 
investments in new technology often well before it becomes really competitive and brings 
profitability.  With successful commercialization and diffusion, innovation continues in order 
to achieve even lower costs and better performance. Standardization, mass production, 
economics of scale are some of the characterizations of technological changes during the 
diffusion process. 
 
Common to all of these innovative activities is accumulated knowledge, often called 
technological learning.  Some of it is embodied in capital; some is much less tangible.  
Technological leaning is basically a process of learning through experience, through doing 
and using.  It is a process of experimentation, competitive selection of a few among many 
innovations. Experimentation and selection of best ways of improving performance at least 
costs and reducing costs at least effort. Foremost, it is a process whereby new technological 
combinations that eventually merge into full clusters of new technological systems, e.g. an 
airplane, mobile phone, CCS power plant, etc. 
 
History of technology is full of examples of wrong choices and promotions of new 
technologies.   The track record of picking the winners is notoriously bad.  Thus, diversity and 
richness of technological alternatives is generally desirable during the early, pre-commercial 
research and development phase of new technologies. During the diffusion phase the 
emphasis shifts to selective and gradual change under competitive conditions. 
 
Learning 
 
The performance and productivity of individual technologies and technological systems 
typically improves as organizations and individuals gain experience with them. Long-studied 
in human psychology, technological learning phenomena were first described for the aircraft 
industry by Wright (1936), who reported that unit labour costs in air-frame manufacturing 
declined significantly with “accumulated experience”, measured as cumulative production. 
Technological learning has since been analyzed empirically for numerous manufacturing and 
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service activities (e.g., ship building, petrochemicals, steam and gas turbines, farming of 
broiler chickens). Learning concepts have also been applied in a wide range of human 
activities, such as the success rates of new surgical procedures, productivity in kibbutz 
farming, and reliability of nuclear plant operation (Argote and Epple, 1990). 
 
In economics, “learning by doing”' and “learning by using” have been highlighted since the 
early 1960s (Arrow, 1962; Rosenberg, 1982). Learning phenomena are generally described in 
form “learning”' or “experience”' curves, which typically show the decline in unit costs of 
production as experience is gained. Because learning depends on accumulation of 
actual experience and not just on the passage of time, learning curves generally take the form 
of a power function where unit costs decrease exponentially as a function (Gruebler et al., 
Energy Policy 27 (1999) 247}280, Gurebler et al., 1999 and 2000) of cumulative output. 
Other measures include cumulative investments, installed hardware, or other proxies for 
“experience”.  
 
The mechanisms for learning by doing are numerous. These include experience gained by 
individuals in performing routine tasks, improvement in the functioning of organizations (eg, 
plant management, logistics, marketing), and economies of scale (Cantley and Sahal, 1980). 
The causal mechanisms are well established, but learning is not the only means of reducing 
costs. Other factors that are external to learning by doing, such as improvements in upstream 
technologies, can also lower costs and are correlated with growing experience. 
 
Figure 6 gives an impressive example of technological learning in a developing country. It 
shows the rapid decline of renewable ethanol price in Brazil (Gurebler, 2009 private 
communication and Goldemberg, 2007). Ethanol is produced from sugarcane and used in 
automobiles as a replacement of gasoline. Today, most of the new cars in Brazil are so-called 
flex-fuel vehicles and are capable of using ethanol and/or gasoline in any mixture. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that at the beginning the new technology, namely ethanol, was costlier 
than mature technology alternatives, in this case gasoline. However, the new technology 
became increasingly competitive through continued improvements that were sustained by 
substantial investments. Overall, the cost per unit energy declined three-fold as cumulative 
experience increased. This was not a “free lunch”, but rather the result of long-term and 
sustained commitment to promote advanced technology while it is costlier and often also 
inferior to the more conventional alternatives. Cumulative additional investment (based on the 
difference between ethanol and gasoline price shown in Figure 6) was about US $2 billion. 
The actual total investment in the agricultural and industrial sectors for automotive ethanol is 
estimated at some US $5 billion (Goldemberg, 2007). However, Total savings from avoided 
oil import accrued to more than US $50 billion. 
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Figure 6. Producers price of ethanol compared to gasoline price in Brazil. Source: 
Gruebler, 2009 and Goldemberg, 2007. 
 
In fact, the figure of US $5 billion matches well our estimate for the total investments in many 
new energy technologies before they became economically competitive with traditional 
technologies beyond special niche markets. However, the exact cost of applied R&D is 
difficult to estimate because statistics on such spending by private firms is typically not 
publicly available. Moreover, this figure does not include any of the original public and 
private investments into other closely related technologies that many have had “spill-over” 
effects on diffusion. Examples are military jet engines and their conversion for civilian 
passenger aircraft. 
 
Together, research, development and demonstration (RD&D) are vital to the improvement of 
performance and the lowering of costs in the early stages of technological development. 
Essentially, the same applies to technology transfer. For example, the cost of photovoltaics 
produced in Japan halved between 1973 and 1976, but none of this improvement is evident in 
observed prices because it was prior to any installation of demonstration units and thus 
cumulative installed capacity was zero. Such RD&D expenditures are a small factor in the 
cost improvements of technologies that are already advanced to the stage of commercial niche 
markets and are candidates for pervasive diffusion, such as gas turbines in 1980. But in the 
earlier stages, RD&D accounts for a larger share of performance improvements and cost 
reductions. Thus learning curves must be expanded from their standard formulation if they are 
to be of practical use in modelling technological change that results from the changing 
competitive position of technologies. Doing so requires accurate and comparable data on 
applied research and development, which are usually scarce. 
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Emergence of new systems 
 
The recent financial crisis and the ensuing ever deeper economic depression are no doubt 
going to bring additional hardship especially to those without access to basic human needs. At 
the same time, the crisis of the “old” is an opportunity for the “new” to emerge. This is an 
opportunity that needs to be sized and should not go to waste. Joseph Schumpeter has referred 
to this kind of paradigm-changing transformations as “gales of creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter, 1942). As old techno-economic and institutional development paths saturate, the 
chances for fundamentally new development paths to emerge and eventually diffuse are more 
likely.  
 
Cleary, such possible emergence of the new and innovative that could lead toward more 
sustainable and equitable energy futures is not automatic nor autonomous. The crisis of the 
old needs to be sized through effective policies and measures before there can be an 
opportunity for the new to emerge. To realize this opportunity, global societies would need to 
invest in new technologies and behaviours over sufficiently long time so as to reap the 
benefits from technological learning.  Hopefully, this would lead to a pervasive diffusion of 
carbon-saving technologies forming completely new technology clusters, behaviours and 
eventually new, decarbonised energy systems. It is this kind of transition that is at the core of 
Schumpeterian gales of creative destruction and creation of the new. 
 
Equally, this kind opportunity that crisis gives to fundamental change can be wasted if 
societies chose instead to subsidise the old systems and paradigms further postponing the 
change to the new and at the same time creating conditions for ever-deeper crisis and 
depression. These risks are probably higher in the developing parts of the world because of 
the limited financial resources and institutional capabilities to establish effective policies and 
measures to lead toward a new phase of growth characterised by pervasive decarbonisations. 
 
Here we propose that global decarbonisation and universal access to energy services are two 
important opportunities created the current financial crisis and the ensuing economic 
depression. While the depression is very disruptive and particularly destructive for the poor it 
does at least potentially sew the seeds of the renewal provided we are prepared to make the 
necessary institutional and financial investments.  
 
The nature of the challenge 
 
We have shown above that there is a significant global mitigation potential by 2030 at costs 
up to $100/tCO2 (~$380/tC) which corresponds to less than $50/bbl or roughly the current oil 
price. This potential is larger thereafter especially if the price of carbon should increase 
(Fischer et al., 2007). In mid 2008 the oil price was almost three times as high with $140/bbl 
indicating that the price of carbon in this range is not outside our recent experience of energy 
price volatility. We have illustrated above that such levels of carbon price would be necessary 
to achieve low stabilization levels in the range of two degrees Celsius. Staring slowly, the 
carbon prices would have to increase monotonically to many hundred dollars by the end of the 
century. This is an important prerequisite in most stabilisation scenarios for limiting 
temperature change to two degrees by the end of the century (see Figure 5). 
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Technological learning and the consequent change are essential for reducing mitigation costs 
and increasing mitigation potentials. Increasing carbon (and other GHGs) price would induce 
some of the technological, institutional and behavioural changes required for effective 
emissions reduction. Today, mitigation costs are generally lowest in the developing parts of 
the world. This means that the least-cost mitigation efforts also during the next decades would 
imply large investments in developing courtiers and/or carbon trade assuming that appropriate 
institutional arrangements can be made. 
 
To realize benefits of technological learning, “upfront” investments would need to be made in 
new and advanced, carbon-saving technologies that would after scale-up and adoption lower 
the mitigation costs and increase the mitigation potentials. In other words, early upfront 
investments would have to be made to enable potential “buy-downs” along the learning 
curves. This means that large upfront investments would have to be made in now developing 
countries assuming again that they will have the lowest costs and highest mitigation potentials. 
 
 
Figure 7. Energy system investments are shown for two scenarios, A2 and B1. A2 world 
is similar to “business-as-usual” scenarios in the literature with high increase of GHG 
emissions leading to global temperature change in the range of about 4.5 degrees Celsius. 
B1 is a more sustainable future with vigorous investment in new technologies and life-
style changes that results in less than 3 degrees Celsius global temperature change. The 
total investments are in the range of US $20 trillion by 2030 and are slightly higher for 
the more sustainable future B1 due to build-up of capital-intensive energy systems. 
However, in the long-turn, beyond 2030, the capital costs of the more sustainable future 
are significantly lower due to induced technological change and learning. Source: 
Nakiceniovic, Riahi, 2007. 
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Investment in R&D and adoption of technologies improve performance of carbon-saving 
technologies and reduce their costs. However, the process is surrounded with deep 
uncertainties and very few technologies actually achieve the potentials. This is why it appears 
essential to make investments in a whole range of new technologies and systems. Each might 
require investments in R&D and early deployment on the order of about five billion dollars 
(as was the case with ethanol in Brazil, see Goldemberg, 2007, and many other technologies). 
 
We will argue below that additional reason for deploying new and advanced technologies in 
developing parts of the world is that there will be largest energy market across both baseline 
and stabilization scenarios.  
 
Catch-Up and Leapfrogging 
 
A part of the vast potential future markets for energy are those people today who are excluded 
from access either because of the lack of service or because the services are unaffordable. The 
actual figure of those excluded varies substantially. It ranges from some 1.6 billion (WEO, 
2005 and 2008) to 2 billion (Nakicenovic et al., 1998 and WEA, 2000 and 2004). Most of 
those excluded live in rural areas; about 260 million are estimated to be urban dwellers (WEO, 
2005). Provision of access over the next two decades would create a huge energy market 
increasing the potential benefits from technological learning through much larger scale of 
technology deployment. In addition, this would be equitable and very positive for creating 
new economic activities and development.  
 
Assuming an average connection cost for those excluded at thousand dollars per house hold 
(Goldemberg, 2009, private communication) results in global investment needs of some $20 
billion per year. This is a huge sum for the poorest of the developing countries but is humble 
in comparison with other financial flows. It is a pale shade of the hundreds of billions pledged 
by many OECD governments to rescue the financial sector, automotive industry and many 
other sectors of the economy. In comparison, saving 2 billion without access is a real bargain. 
ODA on energy is about $4 billion annually (4% of total ODA estimated at $100 billion in 
2007, Ref. xxx). Therefore, connection of those excluded exceeds substantially the sums the 
developing regions are prepared to invest in energy development in the rest of the world. 
 
In scenarios of future energy development, substantial improvement of energy access is 
assumed. With the large share of global population this renders the developing countries into 
the largest future energy markets. Figure 8a shows the cumulative installed capacity in A2r 
scenario of all power plants in industrialised countries (the North) and the developing 
countries (the South) from 2010 to 2030 (Riahi, 2007). 
 
The capacity expansion is less than half in the North compared with the South. This illustrates 
how huge is the growing energy market in the developing parts of the world. Clearly, the 
capacity replacement is much larger in the North because of its huge stock of power plants 
and their substantial aging. Most of the capacity is fossil in this scenario. As mentioned, this 
scenario resembles “business-as-usual” future worlds with continuous reliance on fossil 
energy, especially coal in the US, China, India, Russia and so on. The total new capacity to be 
installed is almost 50TWe or at least twelve time the current total electric installed capacity in 
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the world! Developing parts of the world would expand with the renewable installed capacity 
through 2030 with equivalent of all power plants in the world today and half as much in 
addition in nuclear plants. The potential improvements of this installed capacity are truly huge 
in the developing countries alone indicating how important the investment there would be for 
the private sector.  
 
Figure 8b shows that this picture radically changes toward zero-emissions power plants in the 
stabilisation worlds even if they are based on fossil-intensive A2r scenario. Stabilisation at 
670 ppm CO2-equivalent by 2100 leads to substantial restructuring especially for the new 
power plants that shift to be predominantly based on renewable energy sources and much 
more nuclear power. Here (and in stabilisation versions of B1 scenario) we assume a universal 
global mitigation effort, based on minimum costs and free trade in carbon and other goods and 
services. 
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Figure 8. Electrical capacity expansion and capacity replacement by 2030 in the 
developed countries (industrialized) and in developing countries in the reference A2r 
scenario (Figure 8a) and in stabilisation at 670 ppm CO2-equivalent A2r-670 scenario 
(Figure 8b). Capacity expansion are new power plans while replacement capacity refers 
to those power plants that are build in place of those that are retired between now and 
2030. Source: Riahi, xxx. 
 
The total capacity additions are somewhat lower due to additional efficiency improvements 
beyond those in the baseline A2r. Nevertheless, the capacity additions and replacements are 
huge especially of renewable and nuclear power plants. About 4TWe of capacity expansion 
are foreseen in the developed parts of the world and 2TWe as capacity replacements. In the 
developing regions the corresponding installations are about 6TWe of capacity expansion and 
about 0.5TWe as capacity replacement.  Together, over 12TWe of renewable and about 
10TWe of nuclear power plants would be installed, or five and half times more than the total 
installed capacity of all power plants in the world. The interesting feature is that half of all of 
these plants would be built in the now developing parts of the world and most of them as new 
capacity expansion and not replacement of aging power plants. This leads to two 
considerations: 1. it offers the possibilities of leapfrogging to the most advanced technologies 
as the market is huge and would likely lead to large cost reductions and performance 
improvements; and 2. there is a potential risk of lock-in in the traditional technologies if this 
needed new capacities are not built with the best technologies. In other words, there is a huge 
incentive that the capital is attracted to the newest technologies and that there is a free access 
to those in the now developing parts of the world. 
Figure 9 illustrates the dangers of the lock-in if some parts of the world that are excluded from 
access to newest technologies. It shows the hypothetical case where China remains outside the 
stabilization regime through 2030, namely it develops along the original path outlined by the 
reference scenario while the rest of the world embarks on a 670 ppm CO2-equivalent 
stabilisation development path.  
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Figure 9. Installed power plant capacities in China by 2030 in the A2r-670 stabilisation 
scenario with full participation of all regions in the global participation, assuming free 
trade in carbon, other GHGs and other goods and services.  Also shown is a hypothetical 
sensitivity analysis where China does not join the global mitigation efforts until 2030 
(after the observation period). The differences in the resulting power plant mix are stark. 
Full participation in mitigation leads to a significant shift toward decarbonisation of 
electricity as well as additional efficiency improvements. Source: Riahi, xxx. 
 
Clearly, this will lead to changes of the energy system in China as well, but the overall nature 
of fossil-dependence would remain while the rest of the world stabilises. In this case, about 
1.2TWe would be constructed of which 700GWe would be fossil, predominantly coal, power 
plants, the rest mostly nuclear and hydropower. In the other case, where China participates in 
the common and shared goal of achieving stabilisation at 670 ppm CO2-equivalent, coal share 
would drastically fall to less than half or just below 300GWe with almost 100GWe gas and 
the rest would be completely CO2 free. 
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Figure 10. Share of carbon-free electricity generation in A2r scenario (Figure 10a) and 
in B1 scenario (Figure 10b). Shown are shares in the developed regions (North) and 
developing regions (South) with the rest being the global fossil generation. Fossil power 
plants with carbon capture and storage are included in the carbon-free shares as well as 
nuclear and all renewable power plants. Shown are shares in 2030, 2050 and 2100. On 
the left is the reference scenario that leads to CO2-equivalent atmospheric 
concentrations of 1430 ppm by 2100 and increasing for A2r scenario (Figure 10a) and 
830 ppm reference for B1 scenario (Figure 10b) while on the extreme right is the very-
low stabilisation scenario that leads to 450 ppm concentrations that corresponds to 
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about two degrees Celsius warming above pre-industrial levels (for correspondence of 
concentrations and temperatures see Figure 4 above). In between are the intermediate 
stabilisation levels. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Share of carbon-free primary energy in A2r scenario (Figure 11a) and in B1 
scenario (Figure 11b). Shown are shares in the developed regions (North) and 
developing regions (South) with the rest being the global fossil generation. Fossil energy 
with carbon capture and storage is included in the carbon-free shares as well as nuclear 
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and all renewable energy. Shown are shares in 2030, 2050 and 2100. On the left is the 
reference scenario that leads to CO2-equivalent atmospheric concentrations of 1430 
ppm by 2100 and increasing for A2r scenario (Figure 11a) and 830 ppm reference for B1 
scenario (Figure 11b) while on the extreme right is the very-low stabilisation scenario 
that leads to 450 ppm concentrations that corresponds to about two degrees Celsius 
warming above pre-industrial levels (for correspondence of concentrations and 
temperatures see Figure 4 above). In between are the intermediate stabilisation levels. 
 
This example clearly illustrates the power of lock-in if appropriate energy systems 
restructuring policies are not pursued and in case the are that significant shift toward 
decarbonisation can be achieved by 2030 provided adequate financing and institutional 
arrangements to support transfer and diffusion of advanced technologies. 
 
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the shift toward decarbonisation of electricity generation and 
primary energy with increasing stringency of climate stabilisation goals. Figure 10 shows this 
trend for A2r and B1 scenarios for electricity generation and Figure 11 the same for the total 
primary energy. With increasing stringency of stabilisation, there is a significant shift toward 
decarbonisation and increasing investment in carbon-free and carbon-saving technologies. As 
we have seen above, the largest growing market for these technologies is in the now 
developing parts of the world (South). This means that increasing financing needs to be 
secured for these critical investments, but also that most of the induced technological learning 
and thus const reductions are likely to occur in these regions. In other words, there is a strong 
potential incentive to invest there assuming appropriate institutional arrangements. 
 
Supportive Measures and Policies 
 
The called-for change toward wider access to modern energy services together with climate 
protection and decarbonization is effectively blocked today by the addictive dependence on 
fossil energy sources. This explains the need for the Schumpeterian “gales of creative 
destruction”. Today, 80 percent of global energy is from fossil sources and this needs to be 
reversed so that 80 percent of energy would be carbon-free or carbon neutral. The old energy 
systems need to be replaced by the innovation, environmentally and climate friendly 
alternatives. In parallel, the reliance on inadequate access to traditional energy by the poor 
which constitutes perhaps upto 20 percent of primary energy also needs to be replaced by 
modern renewable and other clean energy sources. For that to occur, we need strong research 
and development in order to create the necessary scientific foundations for the paradigm-
changing transformations.  
 
We need science and research to gain better understanding of the complexity of processes and 
interactions within the climate system and the earth system. The important aim is to create 
fundamental innovations to help achieve structural changes in the society, the economy, 
institutional structures, and the lifestyle and consumption patterns. We need to establish a 
foundation for the deployment and adoption of new systems and services that lead toward 
complete decarbonisation in the world. 
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In other words, research and development of innovations that lead to diffusion of new and 
advanced technologies and practices are a possible solution to the double challenge of 
providing the development opportunities to those who are excluded and allowing for further 
development of the more affluent. This needs to occur without risking the irreversible changes 
in ecological, biophysical and biochemical systems. In the energy area, this implies a shift 
from traditional energy sources, in the case of those who are excluded from access, to clean 
fossils and modern renewable energy, and in the more developed parts of the world a shift 
from fossil energy sources to carbon-free and carbon neutral energy services. In all cases this 
means a vigorous improvement of energy efficiencies, from supply to end use, expanding 
shares of renewables, more natural gas and less coal, vigorous deployment of carbon capture 
and storage, and in some cases where it is socially acceptable and economically viable also 
nuclear energy.  
 
We have shown that the B1 scenario can achieve these goals in conjunction with measures 
and policies for stabilising at 450 ppm CO2-equivalent by the end of the century. This would 
require carbon taxes that increase monotonically, say to some $100/tCO2 by 2030 and ever 
higher thereafter toward the end of the century. The same goal could be achieve with cap and 
trade measures by the introduction of universal carbon emissions certificates, including also 
developing parts of the world. At the same, other policies need to be introduced to assure a 
more sustainable development path. Foremost, this includes efficiency improvements. For 
example, this includes providing energy services with much less primary energy. Doing more 
with less. Rational energy use and saving would be required implying substantial changes of 
life styles and human behaviour, for example, toward more collective transport modes and 
smaller vehicles. However, this need not mean austerity measures. Small and efficient cars 
can be a lot of fun to drive. 
 
Foremost, would be the measures toward enhancing early introduction and transfer to 
technologies to the developing regions. We have argued that this might be a way out of the 
crisis as investments in these parts of the world would lead to the largest growing market with 
lower costs and highest potential for induced technological learning. Thus, developing regions 
have also to potentially highest “buy-downs” along the learning curves of the new 
technologies. 
 
Figure 12 shows the historical evolution of the energy system and one possible future 
development path toward decarbonisation as spelled out in the B1 stabilisation scenario. It is 
an illustration of the needed transformational change of the global energy system. New energy 
technologies, practices but also lifestyles and behaviour are prerequisites to turn the energy 
system from the current dependence on fossil energy toward a complete decarbonisation by 
the end of the century.  
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Figure 12: History and a possible future of the global energy system in B1 stabilisation 
scenario showing relative shares of most important energy sources (Nakicenovic and 
Riahi, 2007) 
 
This particular scenario describes a future world that stabilizes concentrations of the GHGs 
just above the current levels and thereby limits the temperature change to about 2oC by the 
end of the century. The implied climate change will be no doubt disruptive. Even a global 
temperature increase of 2oC can lead to significant vulnerabilities and disruptions of natural 
ecosystems, water availability and communities in costal areas, see Figure 3 above (IPCC, 
2007).  Nevertheless, a 2oC world avoid the most severe adverse and perhaps also irreversible 
consequences associated with higher rates of climate change. It is the poor and those who are 
excluded that bear the biggest brunt of such changes. This B1 stabilisation scenario can be 
characterized as a transition toward sustainability that leads to fulfilment of MDGs in most of 
the world while simultaneously avoids more drastic climate changes. 
 
The current investments in the global energy system are estimated at some $500bn per year. 
The sustainable scenario depicted in Figure 12 would require at least twice this effort during 
the coming decades to the tune of about one trillion per year or about $20 trillion by 2030. In 
comparison the share for the access is relatively small with about $400 billion. 
 
This should all be compared with the current estimate of some $2 trillion being promised as 
securities and guarantees to the financial and other sectors to curb investments in new goods 
and services. A small share of these guarantees are likely to be sufficient to stimulate 
investments in new carbon-saving technologies and decarbonisation particularly in the 
developing countries as they have the largest potential future markets and investment needs. 
 
The nature of technological change and the associated deep uncertainties require innovations 
to be adopted as early as possible in order to lead to lower costs and wider diffusion in the 
following decades. The longer we wait to introduce these advanced technologies, the higher 
the required emissions reduction will be. At the same time, we may miss the opportunity 
window for achieving substantial cost buy-downs. This requires both research, development 
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and deployment (RD&D) as well as investments to achieve accelerated diffusion and adoption 
of advanced energy technologies.  
 
Current energy RD&D trends are unfortunately in the opposite direction. Public expenditures 
in OECD countries have declined to some $8 billion from about $12 billion two decades ago, 
while private ones have declined to $4.5 billion compared to almost $8 billion a decade ago. 
This means that today we are investing barely about $2 per person in the world per year in 
energy-related RD&D activities. Many studies indicate that this needs to increase by at least a 
factor of two to three in order to enable the transition toward new and advanced technologies 
in the energy systems (Bierbaum et al., 2007). However, it needs to be noted that Finland, 
Japan and Switzerland constituted important exceptions with substantially higher public and 
private energy RD&D efforts. 
 
As mentioned, the required investments in energy are at least a factor hundred larger 
compared to RD&D efforts with estimated $20 trillion needed from now to 2030. This 
translates into about one trillion dollars per year or at least twice the current level of 
investments with most of the requirements being in developing parts of the world. To achieve 
a transition toward more sustainable development paths requires substantially larger 
investment in energy and energy RD&D. All told, RD&D efforts need to be tripled and 
energy investments at least doubled in order to assure the timely replacement of energy 
technologies and infrastructures. 
 
The salient finding of a number of recent integrated assessment studies is that additional costs 
for achieving more sustainable futures and climate stabilization are relatively small in 
comparison to these overall investment needs. Often they are “negative”, namely lower, 
compared to traditional scenarios of future developments, sometimes called business-as-usual 
(BAU). However, the more sustainable futures require higher “up-front” investments by about 
2030. The great benefit of these additional investments into a future characterized by a 
carbon-leaner energy systems and a more sustainable development path is that in the long-run 
(to 2050 and beyond) the investments would be substantially lower compared to the BAU 
alternatives. The reason is that the cumulative nature of technological change translates the 
early investment into a carbon-leaner futures into lower costs of the energy systems in the 
long run along with the co-benefits of stabilization. This all points to the need for radical 
change in energy policies in order to assure sufficent investment in our common future and 
thereby promote accelerated technological change in the energy system and end use. In other 
words, the global financial and economic crisis offers a unique opportunity to invest in new 
technologies and practices that would both generate employment and affluences as well pave 
the way for a more sustainable future with lower rates of climate change. The crisis of the 
“old” is a historical chance to saw the seeds of the “new”. 
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